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NOTE
1. In fact, in TRACE, this is not strictly true. Feedback in
TRACE can actually alter the pattern of sensitivity (Massaro
1989a), but this is a consequence of the simplifying assumptions
made in implementing it. All processing is performed without
noise, and response probabilities are derived by applying the Luce
choice rule to the resulting activations. The noise simulated by this
rule is independent of all other processing. Top-down feedback
can alter the signal (arbitrarily) during processing without altering
noise. That is, feedback can alter sensitivity. When noise is added
to these systems at input, or during processing, and the Luce rule
is replaced by the Best One Wins decision rule, feedback will alter both signal and noise together, leaving sensitivity unchanged
(McClelland 1991). So, the tendency of TRACE to show effects
of feedback on sensitivity is really the result of the simplified, but
unrealistic, noise-free processing assumption. This problem can
be remedied by replacing the IAM with a Stochastic Interactive
Activation Model (McClelland 1991).
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Abstract: Norris, McQueen & Cutler claim that all known speech recognition data can be accounted for with their autonomous model, “Merge.”
But this claim is doubly misleading. (1) Although speech recognition is autonomous in their view, the Merge model is not. (2) The body of data which
the Merge model accounts for, is not, in their view, speech recognition
data.

Norris, McQueen & Cutler claim that all known speech recognition data can be accounted for with an autonomous model
(“Merge”) that merges lexical and prelexical information. This
claim elicits an immediate objection. Autonomous models, by definition, are non-interactive. Merging, on the face of it, is a form of
interaction. How can a model that features interaction be defended as one that does not? In response, Norris et al. waver between denying that merging is interaction and denying that it is
problematic, if it is. In particular, they imply that the part of Merge
that does what they call “phonemic decision-making” need not be
autonomous, because phonemic decision-making is not part of ordinary speech recognition. But this response gives rise to a second
difficulty. If phonemic decision-making is distinct from speech

recognition, then the data Merge accounts for – phoneme decision data – is not speech recognition data, making their central
claim misleading.
Four features distinguish Merge from TRACE. (1) Merge consists of two phonemic stages: a first “processing” stage and a second “decision-making” stage. (2) Because the first (processing)
stage lacks intra-node inhibition, its output preserves phonemic
ambiguity. (3) Connections between lexical and phonemic information are flexible – built “on the fly” in response to task demands
and attentional shifts. And crucially: (4) Lexical information does
not affect the first (processing) stage; instead, lexical information
and the output of the first phonemic (processing) stage are
merged in the second (decision) stage, which outputs a determinate phonemic identification.
So: the first (processing) stage gets no feedback from either the
lexicon or the second (decision-making) stage; the lexicon gets input only from the first (processing) stage; and the second (decisionmaking) stage gets information from both the first (processing)
stage and the lexicon. Given this architecture, the first (processing) stage does seem to meet normal standards of autonomy. The
question is what to say about the second (decision-making) stage.
Is it also autonomous? It would seem not to be since “phoneme
decision units are . . . directly susceptible to facilitatory influences
from the lexicon” (sect. 5.1, para. 4). Yet if the second stage is not
autonomous, then neither is the Merge model overall, and Norris
et al.’s claim to account for all speech recognition data with an autonomous model fails.
Faced with this objection, one strategy is to argue that the
second, decision-making stage is autonomous after all. At times
Norris et al. seem tempted by this strategy. Though not stated explicitly, this view is implied by their contrasting “merging,” “combining,” and “integrating” (sect. 5) lexical and prelexical information with interactive processing. For example: “It is not interaction
that offers the benefit, but the process of combining two different
kinds of information – the lexical and the prelexical” (sect. 8, para.
4).
How can merging or integration be considered a form of autonomy, rather than interaction? Their idea seems to be that the
decisive criterion for distinguishing autonomous from interactive
processes is feedback. That is, Norris et al. seem to consider a system directly influenced by higher-level information to still be autonomous as long as the intra-modular information flow involves
no feedback loops. But this is a problematic move. Reinterpreting
the interactive/autonomous distinction in terms of a feedback/
non-feedback distinction artificially eclipses the theoretical space
for other (i.e., non-feedback) kinds of interactive processing.
Moreover, to automatically classify all non-feedback top-down
processes as autonomous is contrary to normal usage. However,
although Norris et al. gesture in this direction, I do not think it is
(or should be) their considered view.
Instead, Norris et al. seem to endorse a second strategy: acknowledge that decision-making is not autonomous, but deny that
this threatens the autonomy of speech recognition. Norris et al.’s
crucial move in defense of this view is to deny that the second,
decision-making stage is part of ordinary speech recognition.
One might worry that Norris et al. are simply stipulating that
phonemic decision-making is outside speech recognition in order
to justify their autonomy claim. It would certainly appear this way
if phonemic decision-making were a necessary final stage of the
overall phonemic task. But an extremely interesting and consequential claim of their target article is that it is not. In their view,
the ambiguity-preserving output of the first phonemic stage is as
complete as phonemic processing gets in ordinary speech recognition. The explicit phoneme decision tasks that subjects perform
in the lab, they claim, are distinct from the kind of phonemic processing that goes on in ordinary speech recognition. Real-world
speech recognition requires only the first stage; only explicit phoneme decision tasks (of the sort performed in laboratories) require
both.
And sure enough, if second-stage phonemic decision-making is
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not part of speech recognition, then it does not matter whether its
merging processes are classified as autonomous or interactive. Either way, speech recognition remains autonomous, because firststage phonemic processing – the only stage it requires – unproblematically is.
Nevertheless, this line of response creates its own complications. For one thing, even if speech recognition is autonomous, the
Merge model is not, because whether or not phonemic decisionmaking is part of speech recognition, it is still part of Merge. The
system that accounts for the data (i.e., Merge) is not autonomous;
and the system which is autonomous (i.e., phonemic processing)
does not account for the data. This leads to an even more consequential difficulty. It is no longer clear how the body of data that
Merge is advertised as accounting for bears on the processes of
speech recognition. For this body of data is derived from exactly
the sorts of experimental phoneme decision tasks that Norris et al.
claim are different from ordinary speech recognition.
Norris et al. are aware of this difficulty. They respond by claiming that from the data on explicit phoneme decision tasks we can
infer what ordinary speech recognition is like, since the model that
accounts for the explicit data (theirs) contains an autonomous
speech recognition component. This is an interesting claim. Even
if it is their considered view, however, their overarching claim that
Merge is an autonomous model that accounts for all the data from
speech recognition would still need to be qualified. Merge is not
autonomous, even if one of its components is; and the data that
Merge accounts for is not (in Norris et al.’s view) speech recognition data, even if it may shed indirect light on the process of speech
recognition.
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